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Some of the fundamental lessons of the so-called revolution against descriptivism that 
occurred in the 70s are negative and it is not immediately apparent what kind of 
semantic theory should emerge as regards proper names, the alleged paradigms of 
genuinely referential terms. Some of the claims about names, most notably Ruth Barcan 
Marcus’ characterization of names as tags, appear to be too picturesque to provide the 
basis for a positive theory and, without a theory, it would seem that the referential link 
between name and bearer is established by pure magic. Some authors have appealed to 
the causal-historical picture to construct a positive theory, and have endorsed causal 
descriptivism, a variety of descriptivism that incorporates causal factors. I argue against 




1.- Names. The search for a semantic theory. 
In the early seventies several philosophers of language argued for a radical change of 
perspective in the conception of reference. Much of the discussion among the early 
champions of the radical change, most notably Saul Kripke, Keith Donnellan and Ruth 
Barcan Marcus, focused on proper names, the paradigmatic kind of expression that we 
use in order to say things about individuals.1 
 The emerging approach is known variously as Direct Reference Theory, 
Millianism, and Causal o Causal-Historical Theory, and it is also called by some –still 
now, over forty years down the road— the ‘new’ theory of reference.  
 It is quite clear what the proponents of the new theory were arguing against, and 
for some time the theory was and perhaps still is characterized negatively, as anti-
descriptivism, by opposition to the paradigm that it intended to debunk. And thus, some 
of the fundamental lessons of the new approach are couched in negative terms: we 
 
1 Of course, the change of perspective was not meant to apply only to a specific type of 
expression, for the paradigm that the revolutionaries challenged was a universal theory 
of how reference, the relation that connects linguistic expressions with the pieces of the 
world they are about, is possible. So the breakaway affected also indexicals, 
demonstratives and kind terms.  
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learned, among other things, that descriptivism is wrong, that proper names do not refer 
by virtue of being associated with definite descriptions cognitively accessible to the 
speaker. Some names can be introduced and their reference fixed by description (as was  
the case with ‘Neptune’), but those descriptions do not operate by determining the 
reference on each occasion of use.   
 From Kripke’s modal argument we learned that names and descriptions have 
typically different modal profiles, so they cannot be synonymous. And from Kripke’s 
and Donnellan’s semantic arguments, based on observation of and reflection on every 
day practice, we learned that speakers do refer without being in possession of a uniquely 
identifying description, which shows that the backup of a description is not necessary to 
refer when using a name. We learned also that even if speakers associate a uniquely 
identifying description with a name, their uses may not refer to the denoted individual. 
So descriptions, even when available, do not determine the reference of uses of proper 
names.2 
 In this regard, names do not operate like indexicals. Whereas every utterance of 
an indexical has its referent determined by its character (the associated description that 
constitutes the mechanism or systematic rule that operates on each occasion of use to 
determine a referent), no description seems to be required to connect a use of a name to 
its referent. 
 These anti-descriptivist lessons are mostly negative: the conclusion is about 
what names are not, and how they do not operate: they are not definite descriptions and 
they do not operate semantically via definite descriptions. As Ruth Barcan Marcus puts 
it, 
 
Descriptions are prescriptions for finding an object. The relations between a 
name and its referent and between a description and its satisfier are different. 
(Marcus 1993: 212) 
 
 As regards what names are and how they function, Marcus strikes a more 
positive note when she tells us: ‘It [a proper name] simply tags’ (1961: 310) and ‘proper 
names serve as a long finger of ostension over time and place’ (1993: 203). But those 
 
2 See Donnellan 1970 and Kripke 1980. Those arguments, which have come to be 
known ignorance and error arguments, are illustrated by the ‘Feynman’/‘Gell-Mann’ 
case (Kripke 1980: 81) and by the ‘Columbus’ case (Kripke 1980: 85).  
 3 
remarks seem too picturesque and metaphorical to provide a foundation for an 
explanation of the mode of operation of a proper name. 
 The chain of communication, or causal-historical picture, that Kripke and 
Donnellan advanced would seem to give us a basis for a positive theory of the 
connection between utterances of proper names and the things they name. And some 
philosophers, while acknowledging the impact of Kripke’s and Donnellan’s ignorance 
and error arguments on classical descriptivism, have defended a form of descriptivism, 
causal descriptivism, that incorporates elements of the causal-historical approach.   
 In section 3 of this paper I assess the causal-descriptivist move, endorsing some 
of the objections posed by its detractors and adding some of my own. In section 4 I 
discuss the demand for a positive theory of the relation of reference. But first (section 
2), I will highlight some of the aspects of the causal-historical approach that will be 
relevant for the subsequent discussion. 
 
2.- Chains of communication and the causal-historical picture 
‘How does my utterance of a name manage to refer to a person, perhaps someone I have 
never encountered, even someone spatially and temporally distant?’ According to the 
causal-historical picture the answer to that question is that our utterance refers because 
we are part of a chain of communication that connects our use to previous uses all the 
way back to the introduction of the name and the referent. It is the objective fact that 
speakers are part of that chain, not a description in their minds, that makes their 
utterance designate its referent.  
 Of course, this is not to deny that the objective fact that a speaker is part of a 
chain depends partly on events and processes in the speaker’s mind; among other 
things, it  depends on her abilities to use names, following conventions of usage present 
in her community. But the role of the mental in this picture is, quite clearly, very 
different from the postulation of a cognitively available definite description associated 
with the name.3 
 But so far, the answer provided by the causal-historical picture is a story about 
the transmission of the ability to use a name properly, i.e., to refer to its bearer. And that 
transmission requires that the relation of reference between name and bearer be 
antecedently established.  
 
3 I thank Michael Devitt for pressing me on this issue. 
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 The appeal to chains of communication is not a solid platform for a theory of 
reference for proper names. First of all, it is obvious that the existence of chains of 
communication is not specific to names. The use of any expression in the language is 
transmitted and propagated from link to link, from generation to generation of speakers 
as if through a chain. As Joseph Almog (1986: 482) put it, “the historical chain 
preserves the linguistic meaning of any expression”.  I use the word ‘here’ or the word 
‘tiger’ because I have learned and acquired those words from a competent speaker that 
has passed on to me the capacity to use them and thereby refer to the place where I am 
located, or to the feline species. This is a fact about how we learn language, how we 
typically incorporate words to our vocabulary, not a semantic fact.4  
 Second, the chain of communication could have been taken on board even by 
classical descriptivists, who could have simply proposed that what is passed from link 
to link of the chain is a reference determining definite description, such as ‘the teacher 
of Alexander’. 
 But more important: in and of itself, the story of how a name is transmitted 
through a chain of communication cannot the basis of a positive theory of how names 
refer, simply because the chain itself does not determine what a particular utterance of a 
name designates. A Martian anthropologist following the chain of communication back 
to its sources would observe a collection of acquisitions from prior links, a collection of 
uses that lead, not to the bearer, but to the bestowal that establishes the connection 
between name and bearer.   
 Quite often specific acts of dubbing establish the referential connection and 
underpin the subsequent uses of names. But it is clear that names are given in many 
ways, sometimes without there being a specific intentional act of dubbing. In these 
cases a name is bestowed in use. Michael Devitt notes that “nicknames, in particular, 
are commonly not bestowed ceremonially, but rather are used, seem apt, and hence 
 
4 ‘Typically’ because as Scott Soames has argued some names can be used without 
being acquired from other speakers. He mentions an example discussed by Jonathan 
McKeown-Green in which a writer has been told of a region in Ireland in which the 
residents of different towns see to it that there is always exactly one person bearing the 
name ‘Patrick O'Grady’.  Soames and McKeown-Green contend that the writer’s use of 
the name refers, when, for instance, on arriving at a town’s pub she proclaims ‘I am 
looking for Patrick O'Grady whom I am willing to pay for an interview for my new 
book’. (Soames 2005: 301). 
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catch on” (1974:199) 5. 
 The variety of forms of introduction is not exclusive of names: there are cases in 
which speakers explicitly agree to use an expression with a certain meaning a 
metalinguistic ‘dubbing’ ceremony, but it is unlikely that there was a moment in which 
a group of speakers endowed with the authority to fix the meanings of words 
proclaimed: ‘We will use ‘here’ to refer to the place where the speaker is located’. 
Words acquire their usage in a variety of ways and not always in a sole and 
distinguishable act that establishes the correct future use.  
 In any case, the chain of communication leads to a bestowal in use, which is 
both a bestowal and a designating use, or it leads to a metalinguistic bestowal, an 
explicit act of dubbing by which a name is mentioned and fixed to a referent. So, the 
question is: how do first bestowing uses manage to designate? And, how does an 
explicit act of bestowal manage to connect name and bearer?  
 A descriptivist will insist: the connection can only be established via a definite 
description. Let us not forget that descriptivism is not just a view about the semantics of 
names. Descriptivism is a general view about reference: the view that reference can 
only be established by the mediation of a definite description. Without such reference-
fixing mediation, the reference relation between an expression and what it stands for, 
and in particular the relation between a name and its bearer, is a mystery and it would 
seem to be established by some kind of magic. But magic just won't do. Frank Jackson's 
words about the reference of ‘water’ apply to proper names too: 
 
Although any view about how ‘water’ gets to pick out what it does will be 
controversial, it is incredible that there is no story to tell—it is not magic that 
‘water’ picks out what it does pick out—so we can be confident that there is a 
reference-fixing story to tell. (Jackson 1998:82 ft. 36) 
 
So, what kind of reference-fixing story can the anti-descriptivist provide for explicit 
dubbings or bestowing uses, those occasions in which the bond of reference emerges for 
the first time? Definite descriptions are used sometimes to determine the individual 
upon which a name is bestowed.  But in other occasions, according to the anti-
 
5 This is why I have argued that bestowing a name should be seen as a process, for it 
requires success in establishing a practice (a practice that need not be social). See Martí 
(2015), especially section 4.3. 
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descriptivist, the ability to designate an object with its name –an ability that is 
transmitted from link to link of the chain of communication—begins with bestowing 
uses or with dubbing ceremonies in which speakers exercise the ability to make an 
expression stand for an object 
 That ability will be probably explained, as Michael Devitt (2015) argues, at the 
psychological level of language processing and ultimately as Michael Devitt (1974) and 
Michael Devitt and Kim Sterelny (1999) have suggested, in terms of neurophysiological 
events, changes and interactions in brain states, and chemical processes in the body.  
 There is no denying that physical, physiological, chemical and 
neurophysiological processes are present and accompany the actions and interactions 
that end in the successful bestowal of a name. Those are fundamentally subpersonal 
processes. And, again, one does not need to endorse a purely physicalist stance, denying 
any role to the irreducible mental in the explanation of the capacity to bestow a name. 
The philosophical point is that the successful bestowing of a name is the result of the 
exercise of a human ability to make words stand for things. The ability itself can indeed 
be described, but it can be exercised, according to the anti-descriptivist, without the 
appeal to a reference-fixing definite description.   
 Again, this is not an explanation that is exclusive to proper names, nor to 
language for that matter. It is a general story of the human capacity to make pieces of 
the world symbols for other pieces of the world; an ability that empowers humans to 
stipulate that A is a symbol that stands for, or represents, B. I can stipulate that the stick 
figure I just drew stands for René Descartes, and I can stipulate that drawing a hat on 
my stick figures stands for the property of having a beard. If I draw a hat on the stick 
figure that represents Descartes I have thereby represented the state of affairs that 
Descartes had a beard.  
 Lots of mental events, and also causal interactions, neurophysiological events, 
changes in brain states, and chemical processes in the body are at play when all that 
happens, but deep down the final explanation is simply that A stands for B by 
stipulation. This does not seem to go far beyond the metaphorical dicta of Ruth Barcan 
Marcus. The process by which a stick figure, or a name, comes to represent an 
individual can be described, but the description of the physical and, if one is not a 
reductive physicalist, mental processes involved is a third person description of 
objective goings on that falls short from the descriptivist demand. From the descriptivist 
point of view the causal-historical approach provides a description of the circumstances 
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in which reference is established, but it does not explain what establishes the referential 
bond and so it embraces the mystery and the magic rather than dispelling them. The 
descriptivist will not accept as satisfactory any explanation that fails to produce a 
mechanism of selection of a referent that is cognitively accessible to the speaker. 
Nevertheless, as some authors have urged, the causal historical approach may, after all, 
hold the key to a satisfactory explanation. 
 
3.- A semantic theory. Causal descriptivism. 
Causal descriptivism seeks to preserve a descriptivist stance by appealing to reference 
fixing descriptions that incorporate causal elements. The view has its origin in David 
Lewis who proposed that  
 
the descriptive sense associated with a name might for instance be 'the place I 
have heard of under the name “Taromeo”’ or maybe ‘the causal source of this 
token: Taromeo’, and for an account of the relation being invoked here, just 
consult the writings of the causal theorists of reference. [...] Causal descriptivism 
explains, as the causal theory itself does not, (1) how the way reference is fixed 
by means of causal chains is part of our semantic common knowledge, and (2) 
how it depends on our contingent semantic conventions. (Lewis 1997: 353-4, ft. 
22) 
 
Causal descriptivists are not unanimous, nor prodigal, when it comes to giving explicit 
examples of reference fixing causal descriptions. But it appears that the description 
might be approximately something like ‘the individual at the origin of the causal chain 
of communication connected to my present utterance of N’.6 
 The idea exploited by causal descriptivism is that speakers in general know the 
 
6 Approximately, because there is almost universal agreement that the description would 
have to be considerably more complicated, since it would have to include reference to 
linguistic conventions and conditions on the successful transmission of words from link 
to link. For instance, Fred Kroon opens his defense of causal descriptivism by pointing 
out: “I see no need in this paper to say much about the kind of causal descriptions that 
play a reference determining role according to causal descriptivism. It is evident that 
causal descriptions of the form ‘the individual referred to by uses of the name N from 
which I acquired the use of N’ will count, but much more than these should be assigned 
a role,” and he then proceeds to indicate why the description will be considerably more 
complicated (Kroon 1987: 1, ft. 1. See also Kroon 2004 for further discussion and 
defense of the view). 
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linguistic conventions that operate in their community, even if such knowledge is 
implicit. They rely on other speakers, prior links of the causal chain, to learn words and 
they typically intend to use the words they acquire with the same meaning, and to refer 
to the same things as the speakers they acquired their expressions from. That knowledge 
can be described, and according to the causal descriptivist, that description, implicitly 
known by speakers, is the reference fixing description that determines the reference of 
particular utterances of N.  
 
The folk know perfectly well that sentences like ‘Feynman worked at CalTech’ 
carry information about Feynman [...] What is more, they know that information 
transmission is underpinned by causal connections [...] What is more, the folk 
know that the information about an object carried by sentences containing proper 
names typically depends on causal chains initiated by the assignment of a name 
to an object [...] What is more, they know the information carried relies on their 
language community adopting conventions of usage that mean that sentences 
containing names preserve information about what is named (Jackson 2010: 5)7 
 
Some authors have criticized causal descriptivism pointing out that the description that 
articulates the conventions and causal factors that are relevant in the successful causal 
transmission of a name is bound to be extremely complicated, too complicated to be 
postulated even as an implicit belief held by most regular members of the speakers’ 
community. This is a special concern as regards young children since they seem quite 
capable of naming things at an age in which it is it is doubtful that their ability is 
underpinned by the knowledge of a complicated metalinguistic description. But this is 
ultimately an empirical issue, which I will not dwell on.8 
 Causal descriptivism has also been criticized for confusing two different levels 
of explanation of semantic phenomena. Most notably, Scott Soames points out: 
 
7 See also Orilia 2010 (especially chapter 5) for a defense of a variety of causal 
descriptivism. 
8 For other criticisms of causal descriptivism, see Raatikainen 2006 who argues that the 
view fails to respond to the motivations that speak in favor of the classical descriptivist 
stance. More recently, Mario Gómez Torrente (forthcoming) has criticised causal 
descriptivism on the basis of the its inability to represent adequately cases of referential 
indeterminacy. In his discussion Gómez-Torrente proposes also several alternative, and 
specific, possible renderings of causal descriptions, something that is hard to find 
among the proponents of the view. 
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Egocentric, metalinguistic descriptions associated with names are no more part 
of their meanings than similar egocentric, metalinguistic descriptions are parts of 
the meanings of other words in the language. [...] Thus, the general intention that 
one’s use of words conform with the linguistic conventions of one’s community 
translates, in the case of most names, into the intention to use them to refer to 
whomever or whatever other relevant members of the community use them to 
refer to. Some such intention is a standard condition on normal language use, not 
a part of meaning. (Soames 2005: 301). 
 
So, on Soames’ view, the causal descriptivist is mistaking a third person description of 
the way in which names (and other words) are acquired and used to refer to things, an 
explanation that belongs to metasemantics, for a semantic reference fixing description 
that is grasped (implicitly or explicitly) by a competent speaker.9 
 Soames’ criticisms target the transmission portion of the causal descriptivist 
story, for they hinge on highlighting the metasemantic role of the competent speaker’s 
reliance on the conventions of the community where she acquires words with an 
antecedent meaning, words that have an already set use.  
 But in the case of names, as we have seen, the description that corresponds to the 
causal chain of transmission cannot be a reference fixer, since it leads at most to 
dubbings and bestowing uses, and those are the ones that establish the referential link 
that can be then transmitted.  
 One of the reasons the alleged reference fixing causal descriptions need to be 
 
9 I use the label ‘metasemantic’ with some trepidation, for the category is extremely 
heterogeneous. Metasemantics, or foundational semantics, explores how expressions are 
assigned to their meanings, but such an inquiry may include answers to historical, 
sociological and even etymological questions that have little impact on philosophical 
theories about meaning and, if they are characterized as metasemantic, it is just by 
virtue of not being semantic. Or it may include answers to questions about the truth 
conditional contributions of certain kinds of expressions, questions that are clearly at the 
foundation of semantic theory. It is not entirely clear where the description of how 
names are introduced and transmitted falls, nor whether that description has different 
aspects falling under different categories. See Simchen 2017, especially ft. 1, for a 
succinct characterization of different metasemantic projects. 
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more complicated is precisely the need to account for name introduction.10 When 
someone bestows a name on an object the referential link is not established by the 
existence of a chain; and users that dub simply by using a name are not relying on a 
chain either –there simply is no chain. The confusion between semantics and 
metasemantics pointed out by Soames is also patent at the bestowal stage.  
 And it is worth focusing very especially on the process of name bestowal, for it 
will allow us to uncover other reasons to raise further concerns against causal 
descriptivism. 
 The causal descriptivist needs to postulate a reference fixing description that 
establishes a fresh referential link between a name and its referent. One alternative is to 
postulate a definite description that articulates the details of the causal interactions, 
neurophysiological and mental events that operate in the introduction occasions, a 
description that captures Michael Devitt’s presentation of the way in which the ability to 
name is acquired. But the majority of those events and processes are subpersonal. 
Postulating implicit knowledge of such a description would not just be implausible 
because of the complicated nature of the description, nor would it be just a conflation of 
semantics and metasemantics; it would be a confusion of the implicit and the 
subpersonal. It would be decidedly implausible to attribute knowledge, even implicit 
knowledge, of those subpersonal processes to an agent, and make that knowledge a 
requirement to bestow names. 
 Thus, it is more likely that the description the causal descriptivist postulates is 
more generic and that it encodes the implicit knowledge that members of a community 
have of the conventions that are in effect in their community; in particular, the 
conventions for the bestowal of names. In our community speakers know that parents 
decide the names of their children, that official christenings are dubbings, that someone 
who uses a name for the first time, while very obviously looking at or pointing at an 
individual is trying to establish a referential bond and inviting us to join her in the 
practice of using that name when we want to say something about that individual.  This 
is not a point of contention between the causal descriptivist and the non-descriptivist. 
 
10 And indeed this is one of the reasons Kroon insists that ‘the individual referred to by 
uses of the name N from which I acquired N’ will not be enough: “I may be the first to 
introduce the term N” (1987:1 ft. 1) 
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Pace Jackson, who views the non-descriptivist as postulating lack of knowledge on the 
part of the folk, everyone should agree here.11   
 The causal descriptivist and the non-descriptivist agree that there are 
conventions, in particular, conventions for naming and for using names, and that 
speakers have knowledge of the conventions that govern their social and linguistic 
community. But one thing is to postulate that members of a community have a certain 
know-how as regards the conventions upon which the success of social life depends on( 
as Jane Austen would put it), and a different thing is to postulate knowledge of the 
description of uses and customs that an anthropologist observing the society in question 
would write about (or that Ms. Manners would include in her manual of etiquette and 
politeness), even if such knowledge is pushed under the umbrella of the implicit.12 
 Perhaps the descriptivist stance is motivated by the conviction that the exercise 
of an ability or the conforming to a convention requires being in possession of a 
description that articulates that ability or that convention. It would seem then that for the 
causal descriptivist a certain form of (tacit) knowing-that is required in the exercise of 
abilities and competencies, the latter being primary examples of knowing-how. So, 
perhaps one of the motivations for causal descriptivism is the assumption that knowing-
how is a form of or is always accompanied by the corresponding knowing-that, a view 
that requires justification.13 
 But even if we concede for the sake of the argument that competent speakers 
have implicit propositional knowledge of the conventions of bestowal of names, causal 
descriptivism continues to be problematic. In fact, making such a concession brings to 
the surface yet another flaw in the causal descriptivist stance on naming. 
 For, if causal descriptivism is to be a form of descriptivism, it has to postulate 
that the referential link between name and bearer is established by a definite description, 
 
11 “. . . the causal theory of reference is the view . . . that the only thing wrong with 
causal descriptivism is that it holds that the folk know the causal descriptions that 
determine the reference of the name “ (Jackson 2010:115). Of course the non-
descriptivist does not think that descriptions fix the reference of a name, but that is 
independent of the issue of knowledge. 
12 The concern about  complication arises also here. The processes and conditions of 
successful introduction of a name are rather complex and hence the description of those 
conditions would be extremely complicated. 
13 Such a view is controversial. It has been explored and defended by Stanley and 




to wit, the definite description that articulates the conventions on naming; the referential 
link cannot be established just by the performance of actions, accompanied by the 
presence of appropriate beliefs and intentions, that conform to the conventions: for a 
descriptivist, the job can only be done by a definite description.  
 But this is puzzling: in order for the definite description that articulates the 
conventions for naming to fix the reference, the conventions must be in place and they 
must be operative, namely, acting according to the conventions (plus having the 
requisite beliefs and intentions) must be what fixes the reference, what constitutes 
successful name bestowal. And if the conventions are operative, if they do fix the 
reference, the definite description the causal descriptivist appeals to is no more than an 
idle wheel: it does not fix the reference. The anti-descriptivist could even grant that the 
description the causal descriptivist appeals to articulates the implicit knowledge that 
speakers have of language and of the linguistic conventions operative in their 
community; but that does not alter the fact that such a description is simply idle in the 
reference fixing task.  This is a form of self-undermining descriptivism for, deep down, 
it is no descriptivism at all. 
 The appeal to a causal description appears to be just a remnant of the insistence 
that reference has to be mediated by a definite description, some definite description or 
other.  
 To sum up, even if the causal descriptivist and the anti-descriptivist agree that 
speakers have some form of knowledge of the norms and conventions that govern 
language, and even if they both agree that typically speakers acquire the use of 
expressions via a chain of transmission, the anti-descriptivist has several serious 
concerns, rightly in my view: first, that the causal descriptivist is confusing two levels 
of explanation, by taking a metasemantic description to be a semantic mechanism of 
determination of reference. Second, that the causal descriptivist is taking for granted 
that the sort of knowledge of conventions that underpins linguistic behavior has to be a 
form of knowing-that. And finally, that even granting that the speakers’ knowledge of 
linguistic conventions is propositional, what is really performing the task of establishing 
the referential link between name and bearer are the processes, actions, beliefs and 
intentions that conform to convention, not the definite description that articulates them. 
 
4.- Back to the magic? 
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What are we left with? If the description that articulates the conditions that govern the 
reference-preserving transmission of names belongs to metasemantics, and so does the 
description of the conventions that govern name bestowal, if those are not semantic 
reference fixing descriptions, what can we say about the semantics of names? Of course 
we can explain (by appeal to psychological, neurophysiological, historical and social-
conventional facts) how the name was bestowed and how the referential use has been 
preserved, but if that is metasemantics, where is our semantic theory for names? Saying 
that the semantic function of a name is to stand for its referent appears to be the only 
semantic claim we are left with. But this is no more philosophically substantial than 
Ruth Barcan Marcus’ picturesque characterization of names as tags.  
 However, even though Marcus’ remarks may seem too thin, philosophically 
speaking, they reveal, in my view, what the non-descriptivist conception of how proper 
names refer should be. Ruth Barcan Marcus did not write a specific essay or set of 
essays developing explicitly her views about reference, but I think that we find scattered 
in her writings sufficient evidence to form an adequate picture of her views. 
Nevertheless, perhaps because of the lack of an explicit standard declaration of what the 
view amounts to, I think that there is a general failure to appreciate what the crucial 
tenets of the view that Marcus espoused are, and there are some confusions worth 
dispelling. For instance on occasion of the award of the Lauener Prize in 2008, Timothy 
Williamson interprets Marcus’ contribution as follows: 
 
One of the ideas [...] that resonates most with current philosophy of language is 
that of proper names as mere tags, without descriptive content. This [...] is the 
idea, later developed by David Kaplan and others, that proper names are directly 
referential, in the sense that they contribute only their bearer to the propositions 
expressed by sentences in which they occur. (Williamson 2015: 14) 
 
But Ruth Barcan Marcus’ ideas about reference, her understanding of what a referential 
device is and how it operates are different from the ideas that gave rise to the notion of 
direct reference, understood in terms of the contribution of referents to propositions.  
 The idea that proper names are introduced by fiat, that they are conventional 
marks, tags, is really important for Marcus and it appears time and again in her work. 
And it is important for two reasons. First, because it distinguishes names from definite 
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descriptions, the latter being the paradigmatic kind of expression that designates by 
characterizing an object: 
 
To count as a proper name, the expression must refer without being tied to any 
particular characterization of the object. (Marcus 1975: 36) 
 
The distinction between tagging and describing is underwritten by a more fundamental, 
distinction: that between object and property: 
 
Proper names have a logically irreducible use. They permit us to entertain a 
separation in language of the object under discussion from its properties.            
(Marcus 1975: 36)14 
 
The second reason for the importance of the idea of tagging is that it stresses the fact 
that the relation between a name and its bearer occurs by convention, without the 
mediation of associated internally graspable mechanisms of reference.  
 This is why Williamson’s characterization of the importance of Marcus’ 
contribution is not accurate. Focusing on the truth conditional contribution of 
expressions to propositions fails to distinguish names from indexicals and 
demonstratives. Uses of indexicals also contribute their referents to the truth conditional 
content expressed by the uses of sentences in which they occur. But indexicals are a 
paradigmatic example of expressions associated with a reference determining 
mechanism. When we use an indexical or a demonstrative, we are very obviously not 
using a tag. We are using and expression that is governed by a rule of use. 
 Direct Reference theorists, in general, agree with the claim that a name refers 
without it being associated with an internal mechanism that singles out the referent. It 
seems an almost obvious inference that in such cases the referent is the semantic 
contribution that enters the determination of truth conditions, the constituent of the 
proposition (the idea developed by Kaplan). But it is a mistake is to presume that the 
truth-conditional contribution is all there is as a special mark of the semantic function of 
names, without noticing that not all uses of expressions that contribute an object to truth 
conditions (and to propositions) are free of associated mechanisms. Indexicals and 
 
14 See Martí 2017 for a discussion of how this distinction affects recently proposed 
views that treat proper names as predicates. 
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demonstratives are the prime example; they designate via a character rule, a rule of 
meaning that works as a mechanism of selection of the designatum in a context of use.   
 Ruth Barcan Marcus pushes us to focus away from the truth conditional 
contribution, and to pay attention to the mode of connection between expression and 
referent and, on that count, names and indexicals are entirely different, the latter being 
much closer to definite descriptions, not in their truth conditional contribution, but in 
their mode of connection to the things they apply to.15 
 As an aside, it is worth noting that it is often pointed out, but not fully 
appreciated in my view, that descriptivism cannot be an overall picture of the way 
expressions connect to referents. The words found in descriptions are themselves 
conventional tags for properties and relations. As Devitt and Sterelny have stressed: 
 
. . . there must be some terms whose referential properties are not dependent on 
others. Otherwise, language as a whole is cut loose from the world. Description 
theories, which explain one part of language in terms of another, can give no clue 
as to how, ultimately, language is referentially linked to reality.  These theories 
pass the referential buck.  But the buck must stop somewhere. (1999: 51-52) 
 
Curiously, the importance of this issue did not escape Bertrand Russell, the paramount 
proponent of classical descriptivism. Six years after the publication of ‘On Denoting’ 
and long after having officially declared that proper names are abbreviations of definite 
descriptions, Russell tells us: 
 
In the first place it should be observed that the author of Waverley is not a mere 
name, like Scott. Scott is merely a noise or shape conventionally used to 
designate a certain person . . . But the author of Waverley is not merely 
conventionally a name for Scott; the element of mere convention belongs here to 
the separate words, the and author and of and Waverley. (Russell 1976: 163) 
 
Simple, unstructured words are conventional marks. Some, like ‘author’, ‘red’ or ‘tall’ 
stand for properties or relations. Even the foremost proponent of the view that names 
 
15 Another misconception as regards Marcus’ contributions consists in interpreting her 
stance as a precursor of the notion of rigidity. I have argued against this misconception 
in Martí 2012. 
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are abbreviations of definite descriptions acknowledged that there has to be in language 
some basic form of connection between words and what they stand for that is not 
mediated, a bond that holds just by virtue of convention. It is difficult to understand 
why accepting the same for names should be resisted. And in the fragment just quoted 
Russell himself, forgetting his own official views about names, seems quite ready to 
submit. 
 But, the descriptivist nevertheless insists: without internally grasped reference 
fixing mechanisms, if all we can say is that the semantic function of names is to stand 
for their referents, we really do not have a semantic theory of how names refer, no 
matter how much we eventually succeed in explaining how speakers manage to use 
names to refer. Is the connection between name and bearer explained by magic, as 
Jackson complains?  
 Well, no, it is not magic, although the explanations the non-descriptivist seeks to 
provide are not the kind of semantic analysis of the relation of naming that the 
descriptivist demands. But there is a story to tell about how the institution of naming 
emerges, how the human practice of using names came about. There were surely 
evolutionary mishaps and lucky turns that explain how intelligent beings acquired the 
ability to use representations, and among those, words. And there is also a story to be 
told about the bestowal of each particular name: physical, neurophysiological and 
mental happenings that make possible the introduction and transmission of names; and 
an account of the complex conventions that govern bestowing and use.  
 Telling part of that story requires philosophical reflection and it undoubtedly 
raises philosophical questions. But another part of the account of all the happenings and 
processes that determine successful naming and successful subsequent use cannot be 
provided just by philosophers from their proverbial armchair.  
 The kind of explanation endorsed in Devitt (1974) and Devitt and Sterelny 
(1999), recapitulated and further discussed in detail in Devitt (2015), calls for research 
that involves psycholinguistics as much as philosophical reflection. Much of the 
research is still forthcoming, so the explanations are incomplete, and hence Devitt 
(2015) is peppered with remarks such as 
 
 . . . we must look to psycholinguistics to throw more light on [those 
processes]. Still, given the current state of our knowledge of language 
processing, we should not expect too much now. (Devitt 2015:14) 
 17 
 
I agree that psycholinguistics, neuroscience and other empirical sciences will contribute 
to explain the processes that form the basis of the ability to introduce and use names. 
Yet,  I do not think that we should expect or assume that we will obtain a unified 
theoretical account that can be constitutively incorporated into a semantics of proper 
names.16 For physical and mental processes may underpin the exercise of those abilities, 
but they may well vary from person to person. Take for instance the ability to perform 
additions. Different people may exercise that ability in different ways, as a product of 
different mental and neurophysiological processes. Still, they all exercise the same 
ability. Those mental and neurophysiological processes certainly underpin the ability to 
add, but we should not expect that exploring them will uncover a unique mechanism 
and a unique explanation of the ability to add. And, yet, it would be preposterous to say 
that we perform additions just by magic.17   
 Nevertheless, the discussion around the desideratum for a unified explanation on 
the basis envisaged by the likes of Michael Devitt is moot for the descriptivist. For no 
matter how complete and detailed such explanation turns out to be, no matter how 
informed by science, it will be unacceptable, if it does not come in the form of a 
cognitively accessible description that mediates reference. But if such an explanation is 
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